Brokers continue to play a critical role in intermediating stock market transactions for institutional investors. More than half of all institutional investor order ow is still executed by high-touch (non-electronic) brokers. Despite the importance of brokers, we have limited information on what drives investors' choices among brokers. We develop an empirical model of intermediary choice to investigate how institutional investors trade across dierent brokers. We analyze investors' responsiveness to the commissions paid, the broker's ability to eciently execute the trades, as well as access to better research analysts and order ow information. We nd that investors are relatively insensitive to commissions, but on average value research, execution, and access to information. Furthermore, using trader-level data we nd that investors are more likely to trade with brokers who are physically located closer and are less likely to trade with brokers whose traders have misbehaved in the past. There is also signicant heterogeneity across investors, with the best performing investors placing a higher value on order ow information and less value on research. We use the model to analyze several counterfactuals highlighting key ineciencies in the market that raise trading costs.
I Introduction
The last decade has seen a proliferation of trading platforms that have made the modern equity markets highly fragmented. In the United States alone, there are dierent venues from a dozen of national securities exchanges to roughly forty alternative trading systems and other o-exchange systems (Maglaras et al. 2012 and OECD, 2016) . The structure of nancial markets, and in particular the way in which investors interact with each other and the market, is crucial in determining market eciency and how information gets ultimately incorporated into prices. To complicate matters, most investors do not access equity markets directly. Instead, they delegate the decision of which venue to trade in to their broker. In principle, the broker's and client's interests are aligned, as the broker earns a prot from the commission only if the client's order executes. However, brokers might potentially execute the order to maximize their own protability, rather than serving their clients' interest. These issues have attracted the attention of the regulators and policymakers.
Recent policy interventions, such as MiFID II, aim to hold investment managers accountable to best execution standards, and to oer greater transparency around the services oered by brokers to investors.
Yet, we know very little about how institutional investors route their orders across dierent intermediaries. Specically, the central question is what are the key dimensions that investors trade o in making these decisions. In fact, market fragmentation has further increased the intermediaries' incentives to attract customers' orders by advertising dierent services, from execution to access to better research. A key challenge in studying these issues is posed by investors' concerns about the condentiality of their trades.
We overcome this challenge in two ways. First, we develop an empirical model of brokerage rm choice to investigate the execution decisions of institutional investors. We examine an investor's decision on where to execute their trade, conditional on the investor's initial decision to trade a specic security. We abstract away from the trade idea generation process, and instead focus on the investor's decision on which broker to trade with in order to minimize trading costs. In the model investors exogenously generate trades and must decide which broker to route their trade through.
We model the investor's execution decision as a discrete choice problem. Investors choose the broker that maximizes their expected prots, or put dierently, the broker that minimizes their expected execution costs. When deciding among brokers, investors trade o transaction commissions, quality of execution (i.e. price impact), and the quality of other services provided by the broker such as research and order ow information.
Second, we estimate our broker choice model using a rich micro-data set covering hundreds of millions of equity transactions. Our base data set comes from Abel Noser Solutions, formerly Ancerno Ltd. The company performs transaction cost analysis for institutional investors and makes the data available for academic research under the agreement of non-disclosure of institutional identity. Our data set covers the period 1999 to 2014. The data set includes trade-level data for institutional investors, covering a up to 20% of the institutional trading volume in the U.S. stock market (Puckett and Yan (2011) , Hu, Jo, Wang, and Xie (2018) ). At the trade-level, we observe: 1 the transaction date and time, the execution price; the number of shares that are traded, the side (buy or sell) and the stock CUSIP. We also observe the identity of the investment manager placing the trade and the broker executing the corresponding trade.
We merge the Ancerno data set with rich brokerage rm level data from several sources. First, we merge the Ancerno data set with sell-side equity analyst data from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S and Institutional Investor. We use the I/B/E/S data to measure each brokerage rm's equity research coverage across various equity sectors over time. We measure the quality of research using data from Institutional Investor; every year Institutional Investor publishes the All-American Equity Research Team, which lists the top three equity analysts in each sector. Lastly, we supplement the Ancerno data with equity trader level data from BrokerCheck. BrokerCheck is a website operated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and the website contains rich information on the universe of individuals registered in the securities industry (See Egan, Matvos, and Seru 2016 for further details). The BrokerCheck data contains individual level information on the equity traders employed by the brokerage rms in our data set. For each trader we observe his/her complete employment history, qualications, and whether or not the trader has any disclosure on his/her record such as a customer dispute or regulatory oense. In sum, our data set contains transaction level data accounting for a substantial fraction of institutional equity trading volume in the U.S.
where we also have detailed individual level information on the parties involved in the transactions.
We estimate our discrete choice/demand framework following the workhorse models used in the industrial organization literature (Berry (1994) , Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) ). Our setting and data is ideal for demand estimation for several reasons. First, we observe individual investors making tens of thousands of execution decisions in our data. This rich data allows us to estimate our discrete choice model at the investor level, allowing us to exibly estimate each individual investor's execution preferences without imposing any parametric distributional assumptions. Second, a common problem in the demand estimation literature is the endogeneity of prices, or in this case commissions. If brokerage rms are able to exibly adjust commissions based on the actions and preferences of investors, commissions will be endogenous. We are able to address the endogeneity of commissions through an instrumental variables approach that exploits unique institutional features of the brokerage industry. Specically, brokerage rms charge commissions in terms of cents per share, typically rounded to the nearest whole number. This rigidity in the way commissions are set provides exogenous variation in the eective commissions paid by investors.
We use our framework to better understand how institutional investors trade-o commissions, quality of execution, research, and order ow information when deciding where to execute trades.
The rst result is that the majority of institutional investors are relatively price insensitive. The average demand elasticity in our data set is roughly 0.3-0.4. The estimates imply that if a broker increases the commission it charges by 1%, its trading volumes will go down by an associated -0.40%.
This suggests that commissions are not a key consideration for investors and a key competitive lever for brokers. However, having the ability to estimate the impact of these commissions on the investors' decisions allows us to precisely quantify all the other important dimensions driving their 2 choices.
A key factor driving an investor's trade decision is the quality of execution. Traders may dier in there ability to execute large trader orders without moving the market price of a stock. We measure the quality of execution at the trade level as the execution price relative to some benchmark price.
We explore three dierent benchmarks: the opening price on the day of the order, the price at the placement of the investor's rst order to any broker, and the price of at the placement of the investor's order. Given the investors objective to predict future price impact and the inevitable measurement error in our measures, we instrument for the investor's expectations of a broker's price impact with the broker's past price impact history. We nd that a one standard deviation improvement in execution is worth 12bps.
Brokers also oer research to their clients through equity analysts covering dierent sectors, and tailored presentations about potential changes in fundamentals. We can test whether investors value research when executing trades. One can imagine investors valuing the access to better analysts that themselves enjoy more privileged and direct access to the rm's management; and they might value the sales pitches around trade ideas that brokers tend to routinely do to attract orders. Our results show that the average investor is willing to pay an additional 2bps per trade in order to have access to a top equity research analyst.
We can enrich our analysis by investigating whether brokers are considered a valuable source of order ow information. We measure that in two ways. First, following Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2018) we dene a broker informed if he has traded with an informed investor. We nd that investors are willing to pay between 5bps and 15bps more to trade with a broker who has received privileged information about informed order ow. Second, following Di Maggio, Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2018) we can capture the broker's access to information with its centrality in the network of relationships between managers and brokers. We nd that investors are willing to an additional 1.5bps to trade with a more central broker.
We also observe that investor's value characteristics of the individual traders employed by the brokerage rms. Investors are less likely to trade with a brokerage rm whose equity traders are involved in more client disputes and regulatory oenses. We also nd evidence that investors prefer to trade with equity traders located in the same city. Even though equity transactions are placed either electronically or over the phone, physical proximity to the broker and traders inuences an investor's trading decision.
Lastly, we use our rich setting to explore how the execution decisions and preferences vary across investors. For example, while we nd that the average investor values sell-side equity research, we nd that roughly 33% of investors place literally no value on sell-side research. This has potentially important implications for the bundling of services provided by brokers. Currently, brokers typically bundle their services, where the broker bundles execution, research, and other brokerage services into one package. Our analysis suggests that this type of bundling may lead to an inecient over-production of sell-side research as many investors are eectively forced to purchase research that they do not value. Hedge funds are among those investors who place a lower value on sell-3 side research. Conversely, hedge fund investors appear to place a premium on the other type of information produced brokerage rms, such as whether or not the broker has received privileged information about informed order ow.
Overall, we build and estimate a model of investor execution that allows us to evaluate investor's trading decisions and evaluate several policies to improve the current nancial structure. Specically we nd that lower trading costs could be achieved by restructuring the network. We can also explicitly bound the cost of allowing the average investor to trade with one more counterparty between 2-3bps.
I.A Related Literature
The paper relates to dierent strands of the literature. From a theoretical perspective, our work draws inspiration from recent papers that highlight a role of nancial intermediaries in operating as information catalysts. In particular, Babus and Kondor (2018) model the trading behavior of privately-informed dealers in OTC markets. In their theory, central intermediaries acquire more information than peripheral ones. We dier from this paper in that we focus on a centralized market, the stock market. The brokers that we study only convey their client's trades to the market, they do not take positions using their inventory. However, we build on these author's intuition that central intermediaries are able to achieve an informational advantage. Hence, the clients of these intermediaries also benet from an information edge. Glode and Opp (2016) explain that a rationale for intermediaries in nancial markets is their ability to reduce information asymmetry and improve trading eciency. In the same vein, one of the functions of brokers in our empirical setup is to intermediate information. Moreover, brokers in our setup can reduce the trading costs of their clients. In this sense, our analysis incorporates the notion that intermediaries emerge to reduce transaction costs (Townsend (1978) ). More generally, our analysis is also inspired by work studying information percolation in nancial markets, such as Due and Manso (2007) and Due, Malamud, and Manso (2015) .
In the empirical literature, some work points out an important role of brokers in information transmission. Using an earlier version of our data, Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009) provide a useful description of the institutional brokerage industry. They show that institutions value long-term relations with brokers. They nd a bi-modal distribution of fees corresponding to premium and discount brokerage services, where premium services include access to research. Moreover, they document that the best institutional clients are compensated with the allocation of superior information around changes of analyst recommendations. Other work shows that the best institutional clients of brokers also receive privileged information about informed order ow (Di Maggio, Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2018) ) and ongoing re sales (Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2018) ). Evidence that brokers pass valuable information to selected clients is also present in Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2006) regarding future analyst recommendations, in Mc-Nally, Shkilko, and Smith (2015) and Li, Mukherjee, and Sen (2017) regarding insiders' order ow, and in Chung and Kang (2016) for hedge fund trading strategies. Our incremental contribution is to incorporate the implications of some of this work within a structural model to compute the value of broker intermediation for institutional clients.
Methodologically, we estimate demand for brokerage services using variation in broker's market share and a standard model of demand (Berry (1994) , Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) ).
This methodology allows us to study interesting counterfactuals. Using a similar approach, Egan, Hortaçsu, and Matvos (2017) estimate demand for bank deposits.
II Framework
We develop an empirical model of broker choice. Specically, we examine an investor's decision on where to execute their trade, conditional on the investor's initial decision to trade a specic security.
We abstract away from the trade idea generation process and instead focus on the investor's decision of which broker to trade with in order to minimize trading costs.
We model an investor's execution decision as a multinomial choice problem where the investor has a trade order she needs to execute, and can route her order through through any of the n available brokers denoted l = 1, ...n. Investors choose a broker based on the associated costs and services. For convenience and consistent with the literature on demand estimation, we initially write the investor's problem in terms of a utility maximization problem, but show below that the investor's utility maximization problem translates directly into the investor's prot maximization/cost minimization problem. The indirect utility derived by investor i of executing trade idea j in industry sector k through brokerage rm l at time t is given by
Investors pay an investor-broker-sector specic commission c iklt for executing a trade with broker l, from which she derives dis-utility −α i c iklt . The parameter α i > 0 measures the investor's sensitivity to brokerage commissions. Note that the parameter α i varies across investors which implies that investors have potentially dierent elasticities of demand.
Investors also derive utility from other brokerage services captured in the term X klt β i +ξ klt + ijklt .
The vector X klt is a vector of broker specic characteristics that reect dierences in execution services such as price impact, speed, and/or information. For example, some brokers may have more skilled traders than other rms and consequently provide better trade execution. Furthermore, trading ability may vary within a brokerage rm across dierent securities and over time. For example, Goldman Sach's could provide better execution for stocks in the technology sector while
Morgan Stanley provides better execution for stocks in the nancial sector. The vector X jkt also captures the quality of research and other information services provided by the brokerage rms.
For example, Goldman Sach's may oer better research coverage or be privy to better information regarding stocks in the technology sector than Goldman Sach's competitors. The vector β i reects investor i's preferences over the broker characteristics X klt . We again allow preferences for the various brokerage services captured in X klt to vary across investors. Some investors may place a 5 higher value on sell-side research while others place a higher value on execution. The term ξ klt is a time varying broker by sector unobservable demand/prot shock. For example, Goldman's Sach's ability to eciently trade a stock may vary over time that is not captured in the vector X klt . Last the variable ijklt reects a investor-trade-broker-security-time demand/prot shock that is i.i.d. across investors, brokers and time. The term ijklt captures preference heterogeneity within an investor across dierent trade ideas. For example, an investor may prefer to route a particular trade in the nancial sector to Goldman Sachs while routing other trades in the nancial sector to Morgan Stanley. The parameter ijklt introduces additional heterogeneity to help explain why we see a given investor trade with multiple brokers at the same time in a given sector.
Assuming that investors only derive utility from expected prots, the above indirect utility formulation maps directly into the expected prots of the investor. We can write the investor's expected prots of executing trade j in sector k with broker l at time t as
The term β i /α i captures how the various services oered by a brokerage rm, translate into an investor's prots.
Investors choose the brokerage rm in the set L = {1, 2, ...n} that maximizes the investor's expected prots
Under the assumption that the investor-broker-security-time specic prot shock, ijklt prot shock is distributed i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value, as is standard in the multinomial choice literature, the probability that investor i executes her trade with rm l is given by
The above likelihood corresponds to the multinomial logit distribution and is the core of our estimation strategy below. The advantage of our framework is that it is straightforward to estimate in the data and allows us to precisely measure the trade-os investors face when selecting a broker.
III Data

III.A Ancerno Data
We use information about institutional transactions from a Abel Noser Solutions, formerly Ancerno
Ltd. (the name`Ancerno' is commonly retained for this data set). The company performs transaction cost analysis for institutional investors and makes the data available for academic research under the agreement of non-disclosure of institutional identity. We have access to data covering the period from 1999 to 2014. Previous literature has established the merits of this data set (see Hu, Jo, Wang, and Xie (2018) for a detailed description of the structure and coverage of the data).
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First, clients submit this information to obtain objective evaluations of their trading costs, and not to advertise their performance, suggesting that the data should not suer from self-reporting bias. Furthermore, Ancerno collects trade-level information directly from hedge funds and mutual funds when these use Ancerno for transaction cost analysis. However, another source of information derives from pension funds instructing the managers they have invested in to release their trading activities to Ancerno as part of their requirements under ERISA regulation. Third, Ancerno is free of survivorship biases as it includes information about institutions that were reporting in the past but at some point terminated their relationship with Ancerno. Previous studies, such as Puckett and Yan (2011), Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2012, 2013) , have shown that the characteristics of stocks traded and held by Ancerno institutions and the return performance of the trades are comparable to those in 13F mandatory lings. Some estimates suggest that Ancerno covers between 10% and 19% of the institutional trading volume in the U.S. stock market (Puckett and Yan (2011), Hu, Jo, Wang, and Xie (2018)). Ancerno information is organized on dierent layers. At the trade-level, we know: the transaction date and time at the minute precision (only for a subset of trades), the execution price; the number of shares that are traded, the side (buy or sell) and the stock CUSIP. Our analysis is carried out at the ticket level, i.e. we aggregate all trades on the same stock, on the same side of market (buy or sell), by the same manager, executed through the same broker, on the same day.
III.B Equity Research Data
To help examine the dierent factors driving an investors execution choice, we match our trade level Ancero data to sell-side equity research data from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S and Institutional Investor. Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S is a database that provides equity analyst recommendations.
We use the I/B/E/S data to determine each brokerage rms analyst coverage for each sector over time. We merge our trade level data with the I/B/E/S equity analyst recommendations at the brokerage rm, by year, by industry (GICS 6 Industry Code) level. Table 1 displays the corresponding summary statistics. The key variable of interest is the number of analysts employed by a brokerage rm in a given sector. The average brokerage rm employs 1.49 analysts in a given sector.
We also merge our trade level data with analyst data from Institutional Investor. Each year, Institutional Investor publishes an All-America Research Team where it ranks the top three equity analysts in a given sector for that year. We use the Institutional Investor data to determine the number of top rated analysts employed by each brokerage rm in each sector and year. We merge our trade level data with the All-American Research Team data at the year by sector by brokerage rm level. Table 1 displays the corresponding summary statistics. The average rm in our sample employs 0.16 top analysts in a given sector and year.
III.C BrokerCheck Data
We also examine how execution varies with quality of a rm's traders. We merge our trade level data with equity trader data from BrokerCheck. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) maintains the website BrokerCheck which contains employment, qualication, and disclosure history for the universe of registered securities representatives over the past ten years. Our data covers the universe of registered securities representatives over the period 2005-2017 as described further in Egan, Matvos and Seru (2016 Using the BrokerCheck data we are also able to determine the physical oce locations of the brokerage rm traders and many of the investors of our data set. We calculate the physical distance in miles between between each broker-investor pair, based on the modal zip code of a broker's equity traders and the modal zip code of the investor's employees that are registered with FINRA. The average distance between an investor and a broker in our sample is 650 miles, though 33% of our broker-investor trading pairs are within 100 miles of each other.
IV Estimation
We use our Ancerno micro transaction level data to estimate our broker choice/ demand model from II. The model is straightforward to take to the data and allows us to determine how investors value the services brokerage rms provide. Our estimation procedure follows most closely follows Berry (1994) and Berry Leveninsohn Pakes (1995) . However, the extensive and detailed nature of our data allows for a rich exible estimation procedure where we are able to estimate the Berry (1994) model at the investor level. We observe tens of thousands of choices for each individual investor which allows us to exibly recover the individual preferences of each investor without imposing any distributional assumptions over investor preferences.
To facilitate estimation we aggregate the individual trades an investor makes at the month by sector by broker level. In other words we dene the market at the investor by month by sector 8 level. We make two further adjustments to the the Ancerno data set. In our baseline estimation we focus on investor buy trades rather than sell trades. Sell trades may involve short selling which is unobserved in our data set and may include additional costs. In our baseline analysis we also exclude the 350,000 informed order ow trades as identied in Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2018) . Excluding these trades from our baseline analysis allows us to investigate how the execution of informed order ow inuences the execution decisions of other investors. In other words, how does informed order ow spill over to other investors.
IV.A Empirical Framework
Following our framework from Section II the share of trades investor i executes with broker l in market k at time t is can be written as
Following Berry (1994) we can rewrite the share of broker l in a given market (month by investor by sector) as
Notice that the term ln ( m∈L exp (−α i c ikmt + X kmt β i + ξ kmt )) is constant in a given market Therefore we can estimate eq. (5) using linear regression where we include a market xed eect (µ ikt ) to absorb the non-linear term ln
Where X klt is our vector of broker by sector by time characteristics and µ lt is a broker by time xed eect. We describe the construction and details of each our broker characteristics X klt in the proceeding section. One of the key advantages in our setting with our rich micro data is that we are able to estimate a exible heterogeneous coecients model using ordinary least squares.
Although we micro-found eq. (5) in a structural model, we are essentially regressing log trade volumes on a vector of broker characteristics. Micro-founding the demand system provides additional interpretation and allows us to investigate several counterfactuals in Section VII. However, our estimates have a reduced form interpretation as well, measuring the relationship between broker characteristics and trade volume.
In the proceeding section we describe each of the control variables used in our analysis. We then discuss some of empirical implementation issues associated with estimating eq (5) due to endogeneity and measurement error issues.
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IV.B
Broker Characteristics
We are interested in the factors that drive professional investors execution decisions across brokers.
Using our rich data set described in Section III we analyze how commissions, research, quality of execution, and information drive investor decisions. Here, we provide a description of each variable, its measurement, and how we incorporate the variable in our estimation strategy. We measure each variable on a trade-by-trade basis, and then aggregate each variable at the broker-investor-sectormonth level for our estimation as described above.
Commissions: Brokers typically charge investors a commission for each share of stock traded.
We measure the commissions paid on a per trade basis as the total commission paid relative to the value of the transaction.
The average commission on a transaction is 11 points (bp). Figure 1a displays the distribution of commissions paid by investors. There is substantial variation in commissions paid by investors. The standard deviation of commissions is 6bps and commissions range from zero to upwards of 20bps.
To put these numbers in perspective, the average mutual fund over the period 2000-2014 charged an expense ratio of 0.87 and turned over 54% of its portfolio on average, per year (2018 Investment Company Factbook).
A standard problem in this type of choice/demand problem is the endogeneity of prices/commissions.
If brokerage rms observe the error term ε iklt prior to setting their commissions, commissions will be correlated with the unobservable term ε iklt . For example, suppose a brokerage rm experiences a demand shock because it has particularly good information or is able to provide ample liquidity in a given month. This demand shock will show up in the unobservable ε iklt . In response to the demand shock, the brokerage rm may nd it optimal to increase the commissions it charges. The endogeneity problem will cause the coecient −α to be biased upwards such that the OLS estimates will indicate investors are less price sensitive than they actually are.
We address the endogeneity problem using instrumental variables. A unique feature of the institutional setting is that most brokerage rms charge investors a xed dollar amount per shares of stock traded, typically 2-6 cents per share. Figure 1b displays the distribution of commissions charged on a per share basis. As illustrated in the gure, the commissions are bunched around the whole numbers in terms of cents per share. However, the relevant metric for the investor is measuring commissions in percentage terms relative to the value of a transaction. We argue that a one cent increase in the commission per share is more costly when an investor is trading a stock that trades at $1 per share relative to a stock that trades at $1,000 per share. Consequently, the relevant way for an investor to evaluate commissions is in percentage terms.
We exploit the institutional commission setting feature of the brokerage industry to construct an instrument for commissions. We construct our instrument at the trade level as the inverse of the 10 corresponding equity share price scaled by the average commission charged by brokerage rm l:
The instrument is correlated with our measure of commissions in percentage terms c ijklt because, all else equal, a decrease in the share price makes the xed per-share commission more expensive on a relative basis. The instrument satises the exogeneity condition essentially as long as share price movements of a stock are orthogonal to the investor-broker-market-time specic demand shocks ε iklt .
While movement in stock prices would certainly be correlated with an investors decision to trade, what matters for our setting is that movements in stock prices are not correlated who an investor trades with. Recall that our regression specications include broker-time and investor-sector-time xed eects, thus the exogeneity condition requires that the share prices are uncorrelated with time varying quality dierences across brokers.
Price Impact:
Another key factor driving an investor's trade decision is the quality of execution.
Traders may dier in there ability to execute large trader orders without moving the market price of a stock. We measure the quality of execution at the trade level as the execution price relative to some benchmark price P rice Impact ijklt = Execution P rice ijklt − Benchmark P rice ijklt Benchmark P rice ijklt
The benchmark price reects the price of the stock prior to the order. We measure the benchmark using three dierent measures: the opening price on the day of the order, the price at the placement of the manager's rst order to any broker, and the price of at the placement of the manager's order.
In our regression analysis we then aggregate our three price impact measures at the broker-investorsector-month level using weighted averages.
There are two potential concerns with our price impact measures. First, they are inevitably measured with noise. It is unlikely that investors are able to perfectly predict the price impact of their trades. This type of measurement error will potentially cause our estimates to be suer from an attenuation bias. Second, we are using contemporaneous price impact as a control variable which includes information unavailable to investors at time t. Ideally, we would like to be able to control for an investor's expectations about the price impact at time t, given the investors information set at time t − 1, E[P rice Impact ijklt |I t−1 ].To address both issues we use both contemporaneous and lagged price impact as a proxies for an investors' expectations about the price impact: E[P rice Impact ijklt |I t−1 ] = P rice Impact ijklt + η ijklt E[P rice Impact ijklt |I t−1 ] = P rice Impact ijklt−1 + ν ijklt pact and use lagged price impact as an instrument. Provided that the measurement error η ijklt is orthogonal to ν ijklt , then using instrumental variables will help address the potential measurement error issues with our proxies for price impact.
Research:
We measure the level and quality of a brokerage rms research coverage in a particular sector along three dimensions using our I/B/E/S and Institutional Investor data sets. First, we include the number of analysts a brokerage rm employs in a given sector and year. Second, we control for the number of top analysts as reported by Institutional Investor that the brokerage rm employs in a given sector and year. Last, we also control for the number of buy recommendations a brokerage rm has in a given sector and time. The recommendations of the analysts help us understand if investors prefer to trade with brokers with similar market views or with diverging market views. The recommendations also provide further indication as to how much investors rely on broker produced (sell-side) research. We focus only on buy recommendations because our trade execution analysis focuses on buy trades.
Information:
Brokers may have access to dierent information in the market due to the structure of the market and the counterparties the brokers deal with on a daily basis. We use two dierent measures to capture the how informed a broker is. First, we measure calculate the eigenvector centrality of the broker in the network where we dene the network at the sector by month level.
The eigenvector centrality measure takes into account all direct and indirect trading partners (i.e. fund managers and other brokers) and is computed by assigning scores to all brokers in the network.
What counts is not only the number of connections of a broker, but who the broker is connected to.
One potential concern with the eigenvector centrality measure is that it is potentially endogenous.
A better broker is likely to have more trading partners in the network. To address this issue, we residualize our broker-month-sector eigenvector centrality measure based on the number of trading partners the broker has in the corresponding month and sector. Thus our residualized eigenvector centrality measure eectively measures how central a broker is in the network, conditional its number of trading partner. Thus, variation in the centrality of a broker's trading partners drives our residualized measure of eigenvector centrality.
We also control for whether or not a broker is informed in a given market as per Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2018) . Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2018) study the role brokers play in spreading order ow information. The authors nd evidence suggesting that after executing an informed trade, brokers tend to share that information with other investors.
Following the literature we dene an informed trade as abnormally large (75th percentile) profitable trade made by a hedge fund. We identify roughly 350,000 informed trades in our sample of over 300 million trades. In our analysis we control for whether or not the broker received an informed trade in a given month and sector. To avoid obvious endogeneity issues, we estimate our main regression specication eq. (6) where we exclude these informed trades when computing the shares of each broker at the investor-sector-month-level.
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Traders:
Through FINRA's BrokerCheck database we observe detailed information on the equity traders employed by each brokerage rm. For each broker, we observe the number of traders the broker employs, the experience of those traders, and the percentage of traders receiving misconduct related disclosures in a given year (i.e. customer disputes resulting in a settlement, regulatory oenses, etc). We examine how these trader characteristics inuence an investor's trading decision.
V Results
V.A Price Sensitivity
The rst question we tried to address with out model is how sensitive institutional investors are with respect to fees. Table 2 displays the estimation results corresponding to our discrete model where we measure commissions in percentage terms relative to the value of the transaction. As mentioned earlier, we instrument for commissions using the average commission charged by the broker in dollar terms divided by the share price of the stock. Column (1) controls for sector by investor by month xed eect to capture any time varying shock that might aect the investor's willingness to trade in a particular sector in a specic month. Column (2) also control for broker xed eects, while Column (3) present the most conservative specication where we also control for broker by time xed eects.
Consistently across specications, we nd that the average demand elasticity in our data set is roughly 0.3-0.4. The estimates imply that if a broker increases the commission it charges by 1%, its trading volumes will go down by an associated -0.40%. This suggests that commissions are less of a key consideration for investors than one would have expected and are not a key competitive lever for brokers. However, having the ability to estimate the impact of these commissions on the investors' decisions allows us to precisely quantify all the other important dimensions driving their choices.
V.B Price Impact
Given the time and resources devoted by investors in making sure that it is optimized, quality of execution is likely to be a key consideration for investors. Since brokers will have access to dierent networks of clients and dierent infrastructures to match opposite-sign orders from their clients, execution might be quite heterogeneous across them. Furthermore, some brokers might be more specialized than others and so more adept to better execute orders in some stocks but not others.
We investigate how investors take execution into account when deciding where to route their orders in Table 3 . Columns (1) and (2) presents the estimation when using the price at the time of the order as benchmark, while Columns (3) and (4) check whether the results dier when using the opening price as benchmark, and nally Columns (5) and (6) while odd columns presents the results when we also instrument price impact to alleviate concerns about measurement error.
Overall, the results are both statistically and economically signicant. Specically, we nd that a one standard deviation improvement in execution is worth about 12bps. In other words, investors would be willing to pay more than three times the current fees in order to ensure a better execution.
V.C Value of Research
Most high-touch brokers try to attract clients' order ow by providing other type of services other than execution. One of the most visible services oered by brokers is access to research analysts covering an important cross section of sectors. In addition to provide recommendations based on the valuation of rms' fundamentals, oering these services also ultimately translates into potentially protable trading tips. These services have come under scrutiny as the recently introduced MiFID II requires brokers to unbundle research from other services.
Our framework allows us to test whether research is actually value by investors. Table 4 presents the results where in addition to commissions, we include the number of analysts, the number of top rated analysts as ranked by Institutional Investors, and the number of buy recommendations as main explanatory variables. 1 Columns (1)-(3) present the results where each research variable is added in isolation in the regression, while Column (4) presents the multivariate version. Our results show that the average investor is willing to pay an additional 2-3bps per trade in order to have access to a top equity research analyst, while on average having access to additional analysts is worth less than 1bps. This suggests that the average investor does value research, although to a signicantly less extent than execution.
V.D Value of Information
Recent studies by Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2018) and Di Maggio, Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2018) have shown that brokers are an important hub for order ow information, which can be strategically released to some investors in order to attract their business.
We can then enrich our analysis by investigating how much order ow information is actually valued.
We measure order ow information with the broker's centrality in the network of relationships between managers and brokers. The idea being that more central brokers tend to trade with better performing investors who are themselves more likely to submit informed trades. Second, we identies instances in which the broker has received an informed order in a particular stock and create a dummy variables for those events. Intuitively, those are instances in which it is more likely that the broker will be able to provide order ow information to other traders. Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 5 provide the estimation results for the univariate case, while Column (3) reports the multivariate case. We nd that investors are willing to an additional 1.5bps to trade with a more central broker. The results are even more economically signicant when we consider the informed 1 Since we only consider buy orders, these are likely to be aected only by buy recommendations. 14 broker measure. We nd that the value of trading with an informed broker is roughly equal to 6-7bps, so way higher than the value of research. Intuitively, the color that can be provided by brokers about current order ow is signicantly more impactful than the research analysis publicly released.
V.E Value of Traders Lastly, we are able to match the Ancerno data with information about the characteristics of the traders working for the brokers. Table 6 presents the estimation results with Column (1) focusing on the fraction of traders that engaged in misconduct, Column (2) on the log number of traders working for a broker, Column (3) on the average experience of the traders, and nally Column (4) on the distance between the location of the traders and investors. The last column presents the multivariate version. We nd that investors are less likely to trade with a brokerage rm whose equity traders are involved in more client disputes and regulatory oenses. A one percentage point decrease in misconduct is worth about 1.3bps. We also nd evidence that investors prefer to trade with equity traders located in the same city. The value of being within 100 miles of the broker is worth about 8-9bps. Finally, Table 7 presents very similar results once we include the dierent dimensions in the same specication.
VI Heterogeneity
Here, we re-estimate our broker choice model where we allow the preferences to vary across investors.
Specically we re-estimate eq. (6) where we allow an investor's preferences over commissions (α i ) and other broker characteristics (β i and µ ilt ) to vary across investors. To ensure we have enough power to estimate coecients for each investor, we restrict our attention to those 254 investors where we observe at least 1,000 observations at the investor-broker-sector-month level. Table 8 displays the corresponding estimates. We report the mean and standard deviation of the estimated distribution of investor preferences. The mean preference coecients are in line with our baseline estimates from Section V where assume that all investors have the same preference coecients ( Table 7) . The estimates also indicate that there is substantial variation across investors in terms of the value they place on the execution services oered by brokers. In the proceeding subsections we investigate the heterogeneity in terms of demand elasticity, value of research and the value of information.
VI.A Demand Elasticity
We nd that elasticity of demand varies dramatically across investors. Figure 2a displays the distribution of estimated demand elasticities. The average elasticity is 0.40, but varies across investors from zero to 0.80. Even among the most price sensitive investors, demand is still relatively inelastic.
We examine how the elasticity of demand varies across various investor characteristics in the 15 following regression specication:
where we control for investor characteristics in X it . The vector X it includes a set of dummy variables indicating or not the investor is a hedge fund, large investor (above average), high performing investor (above average), and high churn investor (above average). We also control for the number of brokers an investor trades with in X it . Table 9a displays the corresponding estimates. The estimates indicate that larger investors tend to have less elastic demand while rms with more network links/trading partners tend to have more elastic demand.
VI.B Value of Research
Our estimates also indicate that investors have heterogeneous preferences over the value of research.
We calculate the value each investor places on research as the V alue of Research l = β research,i /α i , which tells us how much value the investor places on research in terms of basis points. We focus our analysis on the value investors place on top research analysts. Figure 2b displays the distribution of values investors place on a top research analyst. The average investors is willing to pay an additional 3bps to trade with a top research analyst. However, the estimates suggest that roughly one-third of investors place essentially no value on top research analysts. This has potentially important implications for unbundling of services provided by brokers. Currently, brokers typically provided a bundled product to investors, where they bundle execution, research, and other brokerage services into one package. The results displayed in Figure 2b indicate that bundling may lead to an inecient over-production of sell-side research as many investors are eectively force to purchase research that they do not value.
We examine how investor's preferences over research varies across various investor characteristics in the following regression specication:
where we again control for investor characteristics in X it . Table 9b displays the corresponding regression estimates. We nd that hedge funds place less almost no value on sell-side research.
Conversely, large investors place as about twice as much weight on research relative to the average investor. We also nd evidence suggesting that better performing investors tend to place less value on sell-side research.
VI.C Value of Information
We also nd that investors place dierent values on the information produced by brokers. We calculate the value each investor places on an trading with an informed trader as V alue of Inf ormation l = β Inf ormed,i /α i , which tells us how much the more an investor is willing to pay in order to trade with an informed brokers. Figure 2c displays the distribution of values investors place on information.
The average investors is willing to pay an additional 14 bps to trade with an informed broker.
We examine how the value investors place on information varies across investors in the following regression specication:
where we again control for investor characteristics in X it . Table 9c displays the corresponding regression estimates. Our estimate suggest that hedge funds place a larger value on order ow information, putting about 5x as much weight on that characteristic relative to other investors when choosing a broker. Conversely, large investors place a lower value on order ow information.
VII Counterfactuals
Our quantitative model also yields insight into the structure of the broker-investor network and allows us to quantify frictions in the network. Here we use our model to estimate the costs of forming a new link in the network and trading with a new counterparty.
Building on our framework from Section II, an investor's expected prots of trading through the broker in her network L = {1, 2, ...n} that maximizes her prots is
where C is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. We consider the following hypothetical experiment to place a lower bound on the cost of establishing a link with a new trading partner. Suppose that an investor forms a link with a new trading partner such that the size of the investor's network increases from L = {1, 2, ...n}to L + {1, 2, ...n, n + 1}. As a result of the network expansion, the investor's expected trading costs fall by E[π ijkt |L + ] − E[π ijkt |L] ≥ 0. It must be that the cost of forming a new network link F, is greater than the expected benet
Empirically, we consider the experiment of adding a broker with average characteristicsc andX to each investor's trading network. We compute that adding an average broker to an investor's trading network lowers the investor's expected trading costs by 2bp on average. Thus, the cost of adding a new link F must be greater than 2bps.
We also consider the experiment where we remove a broker from an investor's network to calculate an upper bound on the cost of adding a new network link F . Suppose we remove a link from an investors trading network such that the size of the investor's network decreases from L = {1, 2, ...n}to L − {1, 2, ...n − 1}. Revealed preference indicates that, because the investor set up the network L, it must be the case that the expected benets of increasing the investor's network from L − to L are greater than the cost E[π ijkt |L] − E[π ijkt |L − ] ≥ F. Empirically, we consider the experiment of removing an average broker, in terms of the broker's characteristics, from each investor's trading network. We nd that removing the average broker from an investor's trading network increases an investor's expected trading costs by 3bps on average. Thus, our estimates indicate that the cost of adding a new link must be greater than 2bp and less than 3bps, 2bp<F < 3bp.
VIII Conclusions
The choice of trading venue is a key component of traders' job description and an integral part of their strategy as it is one of the main factors aecting protability. Such a choice has become even more important with the proliferation of dierent intermediaries and electronic platforms. However,
given investors' concerns about the condentiality of their trading strategies, it is not surprising that we know very little about what drives investors' choices among brokers.
This paper is a rst step towards a better understanding of the value provided by dierent brokers to investors. Some brokers are better than others in providing best execution, while some brokers oer access to top research analysts with insights about trends in the market, while nally others seem to be more able to provide valuable order ow information. We develop and estimate an empirical model of intermediary choice to investigate investors' responsiveness to all of these dierent dimensions. We nd that investors are relatively insensitive to commissions, but on average value research, execution, and access to information. Furthermore, they are less likely to trade with a broker whose traders have misbehaved in the past. There is also a signicant heterogeneity across investors, with the most active and best performers valuing less research and more the access to order ow information. We exploit the model to analyze several counterfactuals highlighting key ineciencies in the market that raise trading costs. Table 8 .
22 Note: Table 1 displays the summary statistics corresponding to our data set. Observations are at the investor by month by sector by broker level. The symbols *,**, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 3 displays the estimation results corresponding to our discrete choice broker model (eq. 6).
The unit of observation is at the manager by broker by month by sector (6-digit GICS) over the period 1999-2014. We measure commissions in percentage terms relative to the value of the transaction. Because of the potential endogeneity of commissions, we instrument for commissions using the average commission charged by the broker in dollar terms divided by the share price of the stock.
Price Impact is measured as the execution price relative to the benchmark price in percentage terms ExecutionP x−BenchmarkP x BenchmarkP x
. We use three dierent benchmark prices: the price at the time of the order, the opening price, and the price at the manager's rst order. To account for measurement error, we also instrument for Price Impact using lagged Price Impact. Standard errors are clustered at the broker by year level and are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Note: Table 6 displays the estimation results corresponding to our discrete choice broker model (eq. 6). The unit of observation is at the manager by broker by month by sector (6-digit GICS) over the period 1999-2014. Each independent variable is described in detail in Section IV.B. We measure commissions in percentage terms relative to the value of the transaction. Because of the potential endogeneity of commissions, we instrument for commissions using the average commission charged by the broker in dollar terms divided by the share price of the stock. Standard errors are clustered at the broker by year level and are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Value of an Informed Broker (bp) 13.56 7.29 6.23
Note: Table 7 displays the estimation results corresponding to our discrete choice broker model (eq. 6). The unit of observation is at the manager by broker by month by sector (6-digit GICS) over the period 1999-2014. Each independent variable is described in detail in Section IV.B. We measure commissions in percentage terms relative to the value of the transaction. Standard errors are clustered at the broker by year level and are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Note: Table 8 displays the estimation results corresponding to our heterogenous coecient discrete choice broker model (eq. 6). The unit of observation is at the manager by broker by month by sector (6-digit GICS) over the period 1999-2014. Here, we allow preferences to vary across investors.
Commissions
Consequently, we report the mean and standard deviation of preferences across the investors in our sample. To control for outliers, we report the estimated coecients winsorized at the 1% level. Each independent variable is described in detail in Section IV.B. We measure commissions in percentage terms relative to the value of the transaction. The symbols *,**, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Note: Table 9 displays the estimation results corresponding to linear regressions displayed in equations (7)-(9). The unit of observation is at the manager by year level. The dependent variable in panel (a) is the investor's sensitivity to prices, α i , corresponding to our estimates in Table 8 . The dependent variable in panel (b) is the investor's sensitivity to a top research analyst, β i,Research , corresponding to our estimates in Table 8 . The dependent variable in panel (c) is the investor's sensitivity to information, β i,Inf ormed , corresponding to our estimates in Table 8 . The variables Big
29
Investor, High Performance, and High Churn are dummy variables indicating that the investor is above the mean in the respective categories. We measure commissions in percentage terms relative to the value of the transaction. Standard errors are clustered at the broker level and are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
